

COURAGE IN THE DEMOCRATIC *POLIS*

This paper argues that the collective experience of classical Athenians hinged, at least in part, on the relationship between courage and democracy. Compared to other Mediterranean imperialists, such as the Persians or the Romans, the Athenians had extremely limited military resources. Moreover, from the time of its inception, the Athenian democracy was a fragile experiment in self-government. Yet its successes, both during the Persian Wars and in establishing an Aegean empire, were remarkable. They encouraged Athenians to draw close connections between their form of political organization and their courage on the battlefield. After the Persian Wars, drawing such connections was characteristic of all Greek states that had joined the resistance, but Athens differentiated itself from the others through a distinctive conception of courage. The problem was that Athens had to produce courageous citizens, without reinventing the city as a militaristic camp, and without compromising the cherished democratic ideal of freedom. The Athenians' solution was to develop an understanding of courage as both an outgrowth of and a foundation for democratic values, such as freedom, equality, and security of the individual. Their public conversations helped them develop significantly novel ways of thinking about courage in relation to democracy. For example, as I argue elsewhere, they developed a novel conception of courage as a civilian virtue that enabled citizens to think autonomously and to carry out their civic duties effectively.¹ In this paper, I will approach their creation of a distinctive vision of military courage that matched the innovations characteristic of democracy as a political system.

For this purpose it is especially important to analyze rationality and shame as elements of democratic courage, and to locate them in the rapidly evolving political world of the late fifth century. Normally scholars approach ancient conceptions of courage through the systematic texts of Plato and Aristotle, who placed it alongside wisdom, piety, justice, and self-restraint in largely non-problematical lists of virtues or excellences. However, alongside and prior to this discourse, the Athenian democracy had developed its own careful formulations and understandings of courage. These conceptions found expression in assembly speeches, publicly funded drama, and legal trials. Throughout the classical period, Athenians, both individually and collectively, found in their particular, contextual understandings of courage, a source of self-definition and a foundation for claims of superiority over their rivals. In particular, the Athenians were highly adept at knitting their conceptions of courage into their own widely acknowledged and unabashedly held democratic values and characteristics. Consequently, they could claim for democracy a distinctive pre-eminence in courage and thereby 'prove' democracy superior to other forms of constitution. Focusing on rationality and shame will help illuminate central points

¹ R. Balot, 'Free speech, courage, and democratic deliberation', in I. Sluiter and R. M. Rosen (edd.), *Free Speech in Classical Antiquity* (Leiden, 2004), 233–59; on courage in the Athenian orators, see J. Roisman, 'The rhetoric of courage in the Athenian orators', in R. M. Rosen and I. Sluiter (edd.), *Andreia: Studies in Manliness and Courage in Classical Antiquity* (Leiden, 2003), 127–43, esp. 136–41.

about the democracy's relationship both to its ideological and military rivals and to the philosophers who criticized it.

I. CONCEPTS, LEXICON, METHOD

I start with a broad working definition of courage—as the quality or disposition of character that enables an individual to overcome fear in order to achieve a preconceived goal.² No one in ancient Greece, of whatever political or ethical inclination, would disagree with that starting-point, although many, especially systematic philosophers, would wish to build in other, more robust normative features. For example, the key to the courage of the Platonic Auxiliaries is arguably pugnacity in the service of a higher, transcendent Good understood only by the full-fledged Guardians. As I examine democratic courage in different historical contexts, however, more concrete meanings will become prominent, as will the relationships between courage, masculinity, and freedom. As we will see, the disagreements about courage arise over the different contextually embedded understandings of how it is socially produced, what elements of the individual it appeals to or draws on, and what its ultimate purpose is.³

Throughout this paper, I will use the English word 'courage' as the best approximation to the Greek ideal of *ἀνδρεία*, that is, 'manliness' or 'machismo.' The term *ἀνδρεία* is an abstraction derived from *ἀνήρ*, or 'man' as opposed to woman. Ancient Greek norms made war the sole prerogative and obligation of men. Therefore, the 'prototypical' meaning of *ἀνδρεία* was that virtue that enabled men, and especially hoplite citizens, to overcome the fear of death on the battlefield.⁴ Naturally, Greek speakers could produce synonyms of this word to emphasize particular, contextual elements of courage. For example, *ἀρετή*, a heroically tinged term, is common in Greek epigrams and means 'excellence' or 'valour' or, in specifically military contexts, 'martial courage'. Thus, *ἀρετή* is a vaguer term offering speakers a traditional, epic

² Beyond the relevant Aristotelian discussion, two noteworthy treatments of courage within larger ethical frameworks are J. Casey, *Pagan Virtue: An Essay in Ethics* (Oxford, 1990) and W. I. Miller, *The Mystery of Courage* (Cambridge, MA, 2000), the latter of which focuses particularly on the role of law. Courage is again a key topic of ethical and political discussion: for a subtle attempt to understand courage within modern liberalism, see J. A. Scorza, 'The ambivalence of political courage', *Review of Politics* (2001), 637–61, which develops the arguments of J. Shklar, 'The liberalism of fear', in *Political Thought and Political Thinkers* (Chicago, 1998), and reacts against Arendt's influential treatment in *The Human Condition* (Chicago, 1958), 35–6.

³ I agree with Roisman (n. 1) that courage is rhetorically negotiable. By contrast, K. Bassi, 'The semantics of manliness in ancient Greece', in Rosen and Sluiter (n. 1), 25–58, at 46, goes too far in emphasizing the 'none too subtle uncertainty about the word's referentiality' and its 'contested nature'. I would argue that *ἀνδρεία* had substantial cultural and emotional power in classical Greece partly because there were limitations to its referential and rhetorical flexibility; it could not mean simply whatever people wanted it to mean. This is illustrated by the fact that political thinkers and agents could disagree over the meaning and evaluation of *ἀνδρεία* and tried to argue the case by fitting their evaluations within prevailing, and shared, cultural frameworks. Thus, rather than being simply a 'matter of what Athenians say' (Bassi, 56), *ἀνδρεία* was a non-arbitrary, as well as a negotiable, abstraction.

⁴ For an illuminating discussion of 'prototypical courage', see Rosen and Sluiter, 'General Introduction', in Rosen and Sluiter (n. 1), 5–8, 13–20. M. Deslauriers, 'Aristotle on *ἀνδρεία*, divine and sub-human virtues', in Rosen and Sluiter (n. 1), 187–211, shows that for Aristotle, similarly, only free adult men can exhibit *ἀνδρεία*: 'Since, for different reasons, neither natural subjects nor gods can act for the sake of the noble, neither can have *ἀνδρεία*' (208).

nuance.⁵ Often in the texts I will use, courage is referred to indirectly, as, for example, when Pericles uses the locution ‘strongest in soul’ (κράτιστοι . . . τὴν ψυχὴν, Thuc. 2.40.3) to refer to those most capable of overcoming fear in the dangerous situations of war. At other times, the ideal of ‘manliness’ is evoked by contrast with negative representations of cowardice (usually, δειλία). While the context often makes it clear that courage is at issue, we must pay careful attention to the subtleties of a speaker’s word choice.

For the purpose of discussing ideology and its impact on political choices, it poses no obstacle that Athenian courage is not quantifiable or verifiable. Naturally, historical authors can represent different individuals or armies as courageous. Herodotus did as much for the Athenians, but his account already represents an investment in glorifying Athenian virtue.⁶ No representation of courage is free from suspicion. Courage is often the way that victors reinvent luck.⁷ I do not, therefore, argue that Athenians were particularly courageous or not, according to a certain definition of courage, or that their courage carried them through in this or that battle. The author of a recent volume on courage has argued convincingly from memoirs and interviews that neither the existence nor the meaning of courage is transparent even to the most apparently courageous soldiers, including the ones we can talk to.⁸ Thus, Millender’s recent attempt to see particular Athenian and Spartan ideologies played out in battles during the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars runs into difficulties because the gap between the representation and the reality is unbridgeable.⁹ Rather, the answerable, and more interesting, historical question is how democratic Athenians tried to promote courage, why their methods took the shape they did, and how their rhetoric co-operated, or stood in tension, with the social, military, and political realities. Moreover, despite the difficulties in talking about the ‘realities’ of courage, courage was certainly a lived reality to the extent that people talked about it, explored its implications, and made decisions on the basis of their views.

II. THE FIFTH-CENTURY IDEOLOGY OF RATIONAL COURAGE

The year 431 B.C. saw the opening hostilities of what is now (rather prejudicially) known as the Peloponnesian War, which lasted, with interruptions, until 404 B.C. The Peloponnesian War was both a military and an ideological struggle. I use the term ‘ideology’ broadly, to mean a relatively systematic set of normative beliefs about

⁵ Bassi (n. 3), 33–7, rightly points out that ἀνδρεία is a post-Homeric term and therefore should be ‘distinguished from its *anér*-specific antecedents’ (33).

⁶ See R. Balot, *Greed and Injustice in Classical Athens* (Princeton, 2001), 108–35, for the view that Herodotus presents the Athenians as courageous and public-spirited, but qualifies his praise by criticizing the Athenians’ use of courage to pursue imperialistic greed.

⁷ V. Hanson, *Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power* (New York, 2001), 1–5, 8–11, has recently attributed the Greeks’ success in warfare, not to superior bravery, but to culturally distinctive ways of fighting, making decisions, and holding leaders accountable. Whatever the plausibility of his larger claims about Western ‘cultural dynamism’ (12), Hanson is right that there is no reason to believe that the Greeks or Athenians, or later European and American armies for that matter, were especially distinguished in courage. This adds strength to the argument that Greek or Athenian claims to superior courage are not only historically unverifiable, but also inherently ideological.

⁸ This is the burden of Miller (n. 2) in general; see esp. 41–5, 281–4.

⁹ E. G. Millender, ‘*Nomos despotês*: Spartan obedience and Athenian lawfulness in fifth-century thought’, in V. Gorman and E. Robinson (edd.), *Oikistes: Studies in Constitutions, Colonies, and Military Power in the Ancient World Offered in Honor of A. J. Graham* (Leiden, 2002), 33–59.

politics, human nature, freedom, and necessity—a set of beliefs, furthermore, that tends to be a self-justifying and (self-) interested interpretation of reality.¹⁰ During the war, democratic orators extolled the Athenians' courage at the expense of their non-democratic Spartan adversaries. According to Athenian ideology, democratic courage was distinctively rational and freely chosen. This conception of courage did important political work for the Athenians. It enabled Athens, the democratic *polis par excellence*, to claim superiority over its non-democratic rival. In this section, I will explore this ideology as it was formulated in Pericles' funeral oration. Scholars such as Loraux and Ziolkowski have studied the funeral oration as a literary genre, but Periclean ideology must also be understood functionally within the military and political contexts that made his particular formulations both possible and meaningful.¹¹

Pericles delivered the funeral oration in honour of the Athenian soldiers who had died in the first year of the Peloponnesian War. We have a record of it in the speech put into Pericles' mouth by Thucydides. In my view, Thucydides' text does not provide anything approaching a word-for-word rendition of the speech. None the less, Thucydides captured its underlying democratic principles, arguments, and sentiments. Thucydides says in his famous methodological passage (1.22) that although he could not recall exactly what was said on each occasion, he tried to stay as close as possible to the general sense of what each speaker said. In her excellent study of the funeral oration as a genre, Loraux has demonstrated that this speech corresponds in many respects, particularly in its ideology, to other surviving examples of the genre. Furthermore, it was a widely witnessed speech. Since Thucydides was writing contemporary history, his record of the speech could easily have been tested. He would have reduced his own credibility if he had fabricated its basic arguments. Finally, as Bosworth has argued, the speech is firmly anchored in the historical context of the first year of war, a year in which the Athenians had few positive accomplishments, other than painfully evacuating themselves from the countryside to the city. It is plausible to view this speech as substantially authentic—that is, as accurately representing the historical Pericles' own ideas about democracy at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War.¹²

After detailing the courageous actions of the dead, Pericles exhorts his audience:

¹⁰ For illuminating remarks about 'ideology', see P. Rose's introductory chapter in *Sons of the Gods, Children of the Earth: Ideology and Literary Form in Ancient Greece* (Ithaca, NY, 1992); the introduction to W. V. Harris, *Restraining Rage: The Ideology of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity* (Cambridge, MA, 2002); F. Jameson, 'Conclusion: the dialectic of Utopia and ideology', in *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act* (Ithaca, NY, 1981), 281–99; P. Hunt, *Slaves, Warfare, and Ideology in the Greek Historians* (Cambridge, 1998), esp. 19–25.

¹¹ N. Loraux, *The Invention of Athens: The Funeral Oration in the Classical City* (Cambridge, MA, 1986); J. E. Ziolkowski, *Thucydides and the Tradition of Funeral Speeches at Athens* (Salem, 1985).

¹² There are two separate but linked questions about the speech: first, the relationship between Thucydides' own views and those of his character Pericles; second, the relationship between Pericles the Thucydidean character and Pericles the historical statesman. On the former, the issue is straightforward: whatever his admiration for Pericles, Thucydides also criticizes views he attributes to Pericles and in particular Pericles' misunderstanding of his own role in the democratic system: see Balot (n. 6), 148–9. The latter issue will likely never be resolved conclusively. But the position I take in the text is plausible and widely shared. Good recent treatments include H. Yunis, *Taming Democracy: Models of Political Rhetoric in Classical Athens* (Ithaca, NY, 1996), 61–6, arguing that the speeches are entirely Thucydidean inventions; S. Swain, 'Thucydides 1.22.1 and 3.82.4', *Mnemos.* 46 (1993), 33–45, arguing for basic fidelity;

'When Athens seems great to you, lay it to heart that men who dared (τολμῶντες) and knew their duty (γινώσκοντες τὰ δέοντα) and had a sense of shame (αἰσχυνόμενοι) in their actions acquired these things' (2.43.1). As I have argued earlier, Pericles impresses upon his audience that the courage of the war dead is constituted by their rational understanding of their duty and by their appropriate behavioural responses to the exigencies of battle—daring and having a sense of shame.¹³ After reviewing that argument in the next paragraph, I will show that Pericles' 'anatomy' of courage must be understood contextually, functionally, and historically.

Rationality is the central plank in Pericles' argument that Athenian courage is uniquely well-grounded. Pericles' emphasis on the Athenians' distinctively rational approach to warfare is made explicit in his contrast between Athenians and certain unnamed others, no doubt the Spartans:

We believe that what spoils actions is not speeches, but going into action without first being instructed through speeches. In this too we excel over others: ours is the bravery of people who think through what they will take in hand, and discuss it thoroughly; with other men, ignorance makes them brave and thinking makes them cowards; but the people who most deserve to be judged courageous are those who know what is fearful and pleasant and are not turned away from danger by that knowledge. (2.40.2–3)¹⁴

The syntax of the last sentence is notoriously ambiguous, but it is safe to say that, for Pericles, Athenian courage includes a rational understanding of what is genuinely fearful and genuinely pleasant in human life, and of how the *polis* helps to create the right conditions for human flourishing, seen in terms of the fearful and the pleasant.¹⁵ He articulates the connections between long-range values and courage in terms of *eudaimonia*—a term (usually translated as 'human flourishing' or 'happiness') which occupied a central role in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*.¹⁶ As Pericles puts it, 'You yourselves now emulate the war-dead and judge that flourishing (τὸ εὐδαιμον) is freedom (τὸ ἐλεύθερον) and freedom is courage (τὸ ἐψυχον)' (2.43.4). In Pericles' vision of a rationally based courage, courage is the virtue that inspires individuals to put into practice their underlying values in the appropriate way, at the appropriate time, and for the right reasons.

A. B. Bosworth, 'The historical context of Thucydides' Funeral Oration', *JHS* 120 (2000), 1–16; S. Hornblower, *Thucydides* (Baltimore, 1987), 45–72. On the near-impossibility of providing a verbally accurate account, see A. J. Woodman, *Rhetoric in Classical Historiography* (Portland, 1988), recently challenged by Mark Munn, 'Speeches in Thucydides', APA Abstracts (2002). For treatment of what can be known about the historical Pericles, see A. J. Podlecki, *Pericles and his Circle* (London, 1998); P. A. Stadter, 'Pericles among the intellectuals', *ICS* 16 (1991), 111–24.

¹³ R. Balot, 'Pericles' anatomy of democratic courage', *AJP* 122.4 (2001), 505–25. For an interesting, though very different, discussion of Periclean *ἀνδρεία* in the fifth-century intellectual context, see Bassi (n. 3), 47–9, at 49, who argues, by contrast, that 'As a political term in the context of the Funeral Oration, *ἀνδρεία* does not refer to an unambiguous virtue, i.e. to "courage" in a strictly positive sense.'

¹⁴ The translation is lightly adapted from P. Woodruff, *Thucydides: On Justice, Power, and Human Nature* (Indianapolis, 1993).

¹⁵ For interpretation of this complicated sentence, see J. Rusten, *Thucydides: The Peloponnesian War Book II* (Cambridge, 1989); S. Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides I* (Oxford, 1991); E. C. Marchant, *Thucydides. Book II* (London, 1961); R. W. Sharples, 'Knowledge and courage in Thucydides and Plato', *Liverpool Classical Monthly* 8.9 (November), 139–40; J. de Romilly, 'Réflexions sur le courage chez Thucydide et chez Platon', *REG* 93 (1980), 3–23; Balot (n. 12), 505–9.

¹⁶ For an excellent discussion of 'happiness' within the framework of virtue-theory ancient and modern, see J. Annas, 'Virtue and eudaimonism', in *Social Philosophy and Policy* 15.1 (1998), 37–55.

Pericles' picture of rational courage is both an idealistic vision and a rhetorical strategy that must be understood in the context of what has been called Pericles' 'grand strategy' for the Peloponnesian War.¹⁷ At the war's outset, Pericles persuaded the Athenians that they must concentrate citizens and possessions within the city, maintain the city's naval strength, plan on a protracted war, and above all not meet the Spartans in a pitched battle in the plains before the city-walls. His grand strategy was, as he himself put it, based on an attempt to turn the Athenians, metaphorically, into islanders:

Sea-power is very valuable. Consider this: if we were islanders, who would be more secure from attack than we are? As it is, we must, as much as possible, adopt the mentality of islanders. We must abandon our land and our houses and keep watch over the sea and the city. . . . We must not lament the loss of houses or of land but the loss of men's lives. (1.143.5)

The 'island strategy' was pre-eminently aimed at preserving Athens's sea-power and empire.¹⁸

To say the least, this was a highly unorthodox proposal because it ran counter to the traditional ethics of the hoplite. Earlier in the century, the Athenians' victory over the Persians at Marathon in 490 B.C. had firmly established the hoplite as the central paradigm of bravery, manhood, and civic virtue for the rest of the classical period. Indeed hoplite battle had been a normative model for warfare among Greek city-states since the early archaic period.¹⁹ The classic hoplite battle took place between two citizen armies of heavy infantry, at an agreed-upon place in an open plain, usually concerning a borderland dispute between two *poleis*, with special rituals and unwritten rules governing the engagement, in particular that it would be over quickly and that captives would not be killed.²⁰ Judged by the standard of the prevailing hoplite ethos, Pericles' strategy of avoiding a pitched battle was cowardly, and many Athenians saw it that way. To take one example, Isocrates argued that Periclean Athens had apparently lost all virtue, probably because it was corrupted by the Athenian empire: 'Instead of defeating attackers, it [the empire] educated the citizens not even to dare to march out against the enemy in front of the walls' (*de Pace* 8.77). Pericles' innovative policy required a lot of persuasion, including what we find in the Funeral Oration, to

¹⁷ The best treatment of the 'grand strategy' is J. Ober, 'Thucydides, Pericles, and the strategy of defense', in J. W. Eadie and J. Ober (edd.), *The Craft of the Ancient Historian* (Lanham, MD, 1985), 171–88. For particular details of the strategy, see A. Powell, *Athens and Sparta: Constructing Greek Political and Social History from 478 B.C.* (London, 1988), 145–54; (2001²), 147–56.

¹⁸ A valuable recent discussion of the island mentality in the context of fifth-century democratic war-making can be found in K. A. Raaflaub, 'Father of all, destroyer of all: war in the late fifth-century Athenian discourse and ideology', in D. R. McCann and B. S. Strauss (edd.), *War and Democracy: A Comparative Study of the Korean War and the Peloponnesian War* (London, 2001), 307–56; the translation of Thuc. 1.143.5 is adapted from Raaflaub at 316.

¹⁹ P. Vidal-Naquet has argued persuasively that, despite the normative status of hoplites in the classical period in Athens and elsewhere, Athens adhered to the ideal model for the first and last time at Marathon: see *The Black Hunter: Forms of Thought and Forms of Society in the Greek World* (Baltimore, 1986), 90.

²⁰ The clearest treatment of the 'normative' status of the hoplite can be found in several books and essays of V. D. Hanson, including *The Other Greeks: The Family Farm and the Agrarian Roots of Western Civilization* (New York, 1995), especially chs. 6–8; 'Hoplites into democrats: the changing ideology of Athenian infantry', in J. Ober and C. Hedrick (edd.), *Dēmokratia* (Princeton, 1996), 289–312.

convince the Athenians themselves, not to mention others, that they were still courageous despite lingering behind the walls.²¹

Pericles emphasized rationality in this context for two reasons. First, the bravery of Spartans as land-fighters was legendary already by the fifth century. In 425, when the Athenians began to attack the Spartans trapped on the island of Sphacteria, Thucydides says,

They had now become accustomed to the idea that these Spartans were not quite so terrible as they had thought, since their first experience of them had not been so dreadful as they imagined when they had landed. Then they had been obsessed with the idea that they were actually going to attack Spartans, but now they began to despise their enemy. (4.34.1)²²

The passage shows how fearful Athenians were of Spartans on land and how pervasive the so-called 'Spartan mirage' had already become (cf. Lys. 16.17).²³

Second, earlier in the century, all Greeks had defined their courage and manhood against their images of Persian cowardice and servility. A striking example of this is a mid-fifth-century Athenian vase (the Eurymedon oinochoe) depicting a semi-naked young hoplite with penis in hand striding confidently against a gaudily attired Persian who, standing bent over, says in a caption: 'I stand bent over.'²⁴ Athenians could not now represent the Spartans, who had once led the Greek resistance against Persia, as cowards; they needed a new trump card. Hence, since the Athenians commonly, and self-servingly, considered themselves first among the Greeks in wisdom and intelligence, Pericles literally made a virtue out of Athenian intelligence by knitting his conception of courage into this widely claimed Athenian attribute. To be more precise, he attributed true courage only to those capable of understanding the place of courage in the architecture of a life well lived as a whole, and denied it to others, such as the Spartans, who were, at least allegedly, less reflective about the place of their own courage within larger ethical designs.²⁵ He built on the prevailing ideology of Athenian intelligence in order to redefine courage.

III. DEMOCRATIC RATIONALITY BEYOND PERICLES' FUNERAL ORATION

Would Pericles' articulation of a rationalized conception of courage have been

²¹ On the potential for the charge of cowardice, see Hanson, 'Hoplite battle as ancient Greek Warfare: when, where, and why?' in H. van Wees (ed.), *War and Violence in Ancient Greece* (London, 2000), 201–32, at 220; P. Cartledge, 'The *machismo* of the Athenian empire—or the reign of the Phaulos?', in L. Foxhall and J. Salmon (edd.), *When Men Were Men: Masculinity, Power and Identity in Classical Antiquity* (London and New York, 1998), 54–67.

²² The translation is that of R. Warner, *Thucydides: History of the Peloponnesian War* (London, 1972).

²³ Note that in the sequel to this episode Thucydides captures the Spartans' own (gendered) emphasis on the virtue of courage: as he records, a surviving Spartan prisoner responded to a taunt by an Athenian ally, 'Spindles (by which he meant arrows) would be worth a great deal if they could pick out brave men from cowards' (Thuc. 4.40, trans. Warner [n. 22]; cf. Plut. *Mor.* 234e).

²⁴ The literature on this vase is growing rapidly: see Cartledge (n. 21), 56–57; A. C. Smith, 'Eurymedon and the evolution of political personifications in the early classical period', *JHS* 119 (1999), 128–41; N. Fisher, *Aeschines. Against Timarchos* (Oxford, 2001), 47–8.

²⁵ Plato makes similar points about the Spartans' overestimation of the value of courage for well-being: at *Laws* 631c5–d1, the Athenian Stranger emphasizes that courage should properly come fourth in importance among the 'divine' virtues, after good judgment, self-control, and justice.

plausible to Athenians? If so, then what functions could it have served for the democracy at war? As Rusten has argued, Pericles presents the soldiers throughout the speech as 'reaching a complex, dignified and intensely rational decision to offer their lives: they must choose between the long life and material prosperity desired by the individual . . . and the claims of the state which must occasionally supersede personal desires'.²⁶ I would go further and insist that Pericles' conception of Athenian rationality is dependent upon his conception of deliberative democracy. In other words, his ideal was related to democracy as a constitutional form. It was a deep conviction among Athenians that their structures of democratic deliberation had a special claim to practical rationality.²⁷ Therefore, they were able to justify their claim to a rational conception of courage through appeal to what might be called the 'cognitive work' undertaken by democratic citizens in the Assembly and other forums of public reasoning. In *Exordium* 26, for example, Demosthenes argued that free speech enabled prudent judgements to be formed in the Athenian Assembly. Everyone gains, he says, even the losers in a debate, from dialectical conversations in which all angles are explored. Since the *Exordia* are standardized preambles, able to be used as introductions for a variety of possible speeches, they are probably all the more characteristic and normative in their ideological claims. Demosthenes' analysis is put into a philosophical register by Aristotle, who argues that many eyes, even of the less talented, can often produce wiser decisions than the vision of a single pair of eyes, however sharp-sighted it may be (*Pol.* 1281a39–b9). Thus the cognitive work undertaken by ordinary citizens, in operating the machinery of democratic government, helped justify the rationally based conception of courage.

In *Exordium* 50, Demosthenes strengthens the relationship between democratic civic rationality and the rationally based conception of courage. He starts off urging his fellow citizens to consider that taking the field is not necessarily brave, nor voicing opposition to war-hawks necessarily craven. He says, 'For the test of speech and the test of action, men of Athens, are not the same; rather we must now show ourselves to have been wise in counsel and later, if in the end this proposal is adopted, display the deeds of courage (τὰ τῆς ἀνδρείας)'. His argument is that, although standard hoplite ethics demands taking the field in a show of manhood, the deeds of genuine courage must be carefully planned in accordance with the wisdom that results from democratic deliberation.²⁸

The ensuing argument illustrates explicitly that speech and action are, in the Athenian conception, closely interdependent. Demosthenes declares, 'So, when you take the field, whoever is leader is master of you, but now each one of you yourselves is a general' (*Exordium* 50.3). This metaphor both links and separates Athenian public

²⁶ Rusten (n. 15), 161.

²⁷ On the democratic deliberative context, see Balot (n. 1); S. S. Monoson, *Plato's Democratic Entanglements* (Princeton, 2000), 51–63.

²⁸ The translation here and in the following paragraph comes from N. W. and N. J. de Witt, *Demosthenes* 7 (Cambridge, MA, 1986). For another contemporary attempt to say what courage demands of citizens, compare the passage in Plato's *Laws* (943–5) where Plato writes into his law-code a distinction between 'throwing away one's shield' through shameful cowardice and losing one's weapons for perfectly legitimate reasons, such as 'being thrown down from a height, or when at sea, or when suddenly caught up by a tremendous onrush of water during their struggles in a storm' (944a8–b2, trans. T. J. Saunders, *Plato: The Laws* [London, 1970]). For further consideration of Plato's revision of the Greek tradition of courage, and particularly of Homeric models, see Angela Hobbs, *Plato and the Hero: Courage, Manliness, and the Impersonal Good* (Cambridge, 2000), 7–8, 175–8, 199–219.

discourse and military action. On the one hand, it shows that democratic equality cannot, and should not, pertain on the battlefield. Then as now, there is a need for leaders with power, authority, and vision to make lightning-fast decisions for an entire army. However, the metaphor also suggests that in public reasoning about the dangers of warfare, each citizen is an autonomous political agent, individually responsible for articulating and judging the proposals aired in public conversations about the city.²⁹ Following Caroline Walker Bynum, I would argue that the contextual interpretation of metaphors and other literary tropes is highly revealing of the shared consciousness of agents in the past who both employed and understood them.³¹ Here, by metaphorically envisaging ordinary Athenian citizens as generals of the Assembly, Demosthenes advances the cultural project of developing a 'logocentric' understanding of courage, which placed dispositions and physical actions within the larger rational frameworks generated by democratic politics as a whole.

This claim to rational courage was central to the Athenians' image of themselves as democrats and as courageous warriors. It helped Pericles prove the Athenians more courageous than the Spartans, whose culture and form of government abjured the kind of dialogic rationalism celebrated at Athens. Thucydides records the Spartan King Archidamus as saying, 'Our education leaves us too ignorant to look down on our laws . . . We have none of that useless intelligence that condemns the enemy's forces in a fine speech but fails to deliver as good an attack in the field' (1.84).³¹ Note, along with this, that there is no Spartan funeral oration to match the Funeral Oration of Athens—a unique institution, so far as we know, which arguably helped the Athenians as much to figure out what their unique brand of courage was, as to celebrate the gloriously civic-minded deaths of the fallen.³²

In Demosthenes' Funeral Oration, delivered after Philip of Macedon had defeated the Athenians at the Battle of Chaeronea in 338 B.C., the speaker argues that 'of all virtue, the beginning is understanding, and the fulfilment is courage; by the one it is judged what ought to be done, by the other this is carried to success' (17–18).³³ The understanding (*σύνεσις*) of the soldiers is here not simply a matter of technical or factual knowledge, but rather the ability to comprehend what must be done (*τὰ δέοντα*, 'one's duties', a repeated idea in the Periclean Funeral Oration: cf. Thuc. 2.40.2, 2.43.1) in the light of their beliefs about how to live the most flourishing human life. A similar emphasis is at work in a roughly contemporary speech of Hyperides, from which only a single fragment is preserved: 'Rash men do everything without reflection, whereas the brave reflect on the dangers they encounter and meet them unafraid' (Hyperides, fr. A.4).³⁴ Democratic deliberation was the forum in which the Athenians' distinctive type of reflective courage became possible, since public debate

²⁹ On the autonomy expected of Athenian citizens, see Monoson (n. 27), 56, 61–3.

³⁰ C. W. Bynum, *The Resurrection of the Body* (New York, 1995), 7: 'This book is intended to explore the plethora of ideas about resurrection in patristic and medieval literature—the metaphors, tropes, and arguments in which the ideas were garbed, their context and their consequences. I assume, as I have done elsewhere in my work, that close analysis of specific images in the context of other images, of theological doctrine, and of religious and social practice, can guide us to the unspoken assumptions, especially the unspoken inconsistencies and conflicts, at the heart of people's experience of the world.'

³¹ The translation is that of Woodruff (n. 14).

³² The uniqueness of the institution and its role in creating and maintaining democratic culture is the burden of Loraux (n. 11).

³³ The translation is that of de Witts (n. 28).

³⁴ The translation is that of J. O. Burt, *Minor Attic Orators 2* (Cambridge, MA, 1980).

demanded both that individuals reflect autonomously and that they submit their visions of the good life to public scrutiny.

The democratic articulation of a rational vision of courage advanced the so-called 'democratization of birth privilege'.³⁵ The Athenians' rationalistic self-image, specifically, took on a particular cast that helped Athenians distinguish themselves, not only from the Spartans, but also from the deeply authoritative cultural ideals represented in the Homeric poems. These poems hold it up as a well-known ideal that the heroes should be 'speakers of words and doers of deeds' (*Iliad* 9.443). These are the two categories in which the heroes are sharply distinguished from the mass of fighters. At the beginning of *Iliad* 2, when Odysseus is shown chastising men of the lower class, he says, 'My good man, sit still and listen to what others tell you, to those who are better men than you, you skulker and coward and thing of no account whatever in battle or council' (200–2).³⁶ The Athenian democracy dignified the Homeric lower classes, summoning them to sit in Assembly, to operate the machinery of the democracy, and to gain recognition by defending the city. The primary feature of democratic political organization was that it allowed the likes of Thersites to become a speaker of words and a doer of deeds. The structures of democratic cognitive work and military practice democratized the formerly heroic virtue of courage by making it available to all citizens of the democracy, by virtue of their recognized cognitive capacities and their resulting courage on the battlefield.³⁷ Even though Homeric debate and reasoning were not 'primitive', as Finley once wrote, the democratic experience was still distinctive by comparison with it.³⁸

IV. COURAGE MOTIVATED BY SHAME? FIFTH-CENTURY REVISIONS

Turning to shame, the second part of the Periclean equation, we find by contrast significant complications in the democratic effort to create a distinctive vision of courage. The Homeric ideology of shame has a much stronger grip. Despite the

³⁵ The phrase comes from Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens* (Princeton, 1989), 259–70.

³⁶ δαιμόνι', ἀτρέμας ἦσο καὶ ἄλλων μῦθον ἄκουε,
οἱ σέο φέρτεροί εἰσι, σὺ δ' ἀπτόλεμος καὶ ἀναλκις,
οὔτε ποτ' ἐν πολέμῳ ἐναρίθμιος οὔτ' ἐνὶ βουλῇ.

The translation is lightly adapted from that of R. Lattimore, *The Iliad of Homer* (Chicago, 1961).

³⁷ On the cultural significance of Homeric models among fifth-century Greeks, especially concerning warfare, see M. Clarke, 'Spartan *atê* at Thermopylae? Semantics and ideology at Herodotus, *Histories* 7.223.4', in A. Powell and S. Hodkinson (edd.), *Sparta: Beyond the Mirage* (London, 2003), 63–84. Self-representation and practice tend to part company here: anyone who wished might speak in the assembly (e.g. Dem. 18.170; cf. Aesch. 1.24, 3.4), but very few actually did. On the distinction between active and passive participation in the assembly, see M. H. Hansen, *The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes* (Oxford, 1991), 306; on the relative sizes of these participant groups, see Hansen, 267–8. As Hansen points out, though, 'The level of political activity exhibited by the citizens of Athens is unparalleled in world history, in terms of numbers, frequency and level of participation' (313). The 'cognitive work' I am discussing would regularly have taken place formally in the Assembly and other public forums, and informally throughout the gathering-places of the city.

³⁸ For a clear and concise statement of Finley's view of the Homeric assembly and Homeric 'counsel', see *The World of Odysseus* (New York, 1978), 121–5; his view of Homeric reasoning as 'primitive' has been successfully criticized by M. Schofield, 'Euboulia in the *Iliad*', in *Saving the City: Philosopher-Kings and Other Classical Paradigms* (London, 1999), 3–30. In his conclusion, though, Schofield rightly points out that 'No council in the *Iliad* is or could be as sophisticated as the debate on Mytilene in Thucydides 3' (30), which, I would argue, is a symptom of the novel structures of epistemological work that took place in the Athenian Assembly.

Homeric ideal of congruity in words and deeds, it was most common for Homeric warriors to be motivated to courageous action by the fear of shame rather than by a rational conception of their good. Shame was a battle cry among Iliadic warriors; it was also a general exhortation, as when Nestor shouts to his comrades, 'Be men; put into your hearts shame before other men' (15.661).³⁹ As Bernard Williams has shown, 'The basic experience connected with shame is that of being seen, inappropriately, by the wrong people, in the wrong condition.'⁴⁰ Warriors can feel shame both before their fellow fighters and before imagined, internalized 'others' who gaze upon their behaviour with a potentially critical eye. Homeric warriors understood courageous action as driven by the fear of shame or embarrassment about the sort of person one has actually turned out to be when the chips are down.⁴¹

On the face of it, the Spartans are the chief heirs of Homer in this respect.⁴² For example, Herodotus emphasizes that Spartan courage is rigorously enforced through social mechanisms of control, especially shame and fear of the law.⁴³ One Spartan, Aristodemus, who had contracted an eye infection just before the Battle of Thermopylae, was greeted with reproach upon his return to Sparta, because, unlike another Spartan with the same affliction, he did not go out to fight anyway. Because he was a humiliated survivor, Herodotus reports, 'No Spartan would give him a light to kindle his fire, or speak to him, and he was called a Trembler' (7.231).⁴⁴ Tremblers were faced with specific legal and social disabilities: according to Xenophon, they found it difficult to marry, they could not be cheerful, and they could not assert their status in relation to younger men, an extreme form of public humiliation in a display oriented, honour-conscious society.⁴⁵ No wonder that Pantites, another Spartan survivor of Thermopylae, allegedly hanged himself out of shame for failing to die in the battle like his fellow-citizens (Hdt. 7.232). A more sympathetic, but altogether consistent, representation of Spartan shame-driven courage is offered by King Archidamus in the first book of Thucydides:

We are good soldiers because our self-control is the chief cause of a sense of shame, and shame of courage; while we have good judgment because our education leaves us too ignorant to look down upon our laws, and our self-control is too strict for disobeying them. (1.84)⁴⁶

This is a far cry from the Periclean rationalism of the funeral oration.

Spartans also tend to be associated with courage inspired by the fear of punishment or fear of the law. This is similar to shame-induced courage in that it too is motivated by mechanisms of social control through which the community enforces its demands

³⁹ On heroic *aidôs*, see J. Redfield, *Nature and Culture in the Iliad* (Chicago, 1975), 115–19; B. Williams, *Shame and Necessity* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1993), 78–86; Bassi (n. 3), 33.

⁴⁰ Williams (n. 39), 78.

⁴¹ For shame in the Periclean Funeral Oration, see Balot (n. 13), 514.

⁴² Clarke (n. 37), 72–7 also explores the relationship between Spartan and Homeric models of courage, with special reference to Herodotus, concluding that in his depiction of Aristodemus, and of the Three Hundred Spartans at Thermopylae, Herodotus 'invites us to consider both instances of battle-fury in terms of the problematic aspects of Homeric heroism' (75).

⁴³ Millender (n. 9), 40–5.

⁴⁴ The translation is that of A. de Sélincourt (rev. J. M. Marincola), *Herodotus: The Histories* (London, 1996).

⁴⁵ See *Lak. Pol.* 9.5 with Powell (n. 17), 234 (2nd edn, 238). Miller (n. 2), 15–24 offers a probing treatment of Aristodemus, emphasizing the 'politics of courage' (23) involved in the Spartans' refusal to grant Aristodemus public honours after Plataea, where he had fought superbly in order to make amends for his earlier humiliation.

⁴⁶ The translation is that of Woodruff (n. 14).

and claims on individual citizens. In another well-known episode, for example, Herodotus reports that the exiled Spartan King Demaratus once explained Spartan courage to the Persian King Xerxes as follows:

Although the Spartans are free, they are not wholly free; for law is their master and they fear it far more than your men fear you; for indeed they do whatever law orders; and it always orders the same thing; it does not permit them to flee any mass of men in battle, but commands that they remain in their battle ranks and either conquer or die. (7.104–105)⁴⁷

As Forsdyke has said, ‘Spartan courage depends on law/custom (*nomos*) and is socially enforced through shame. Fear of social humiliation motivates Spartan courage, as can be seen by the examples of those Spartans who avoided death at Thermopylae (Hdt. 7.231–32; cf. 9.71)’.⁴⁸

Because of the Spartan emphasis on shame, we appear to have arrived at a clear ideological contrast between Athenian rational courage and the Spartans’ socially compulsory courage. With reference to the influence of democratic ideology on Herodotus, Millender has called this contrast an ‘implied polarity between Sparta’s compelled bravery and the Athenians’ more spontaneous brand of courage’.⁴⁹ Obviously the contrast is meant to favour Athens. But we should not accept this neat picture in its entirety without looking at both Spartans and Athenians more carefully. Indeed there are several problems worth untangling here. First, as far as the social production of courage goes, the Spartans were generally considered very good at it, even by Athenians, and on the battlefield their courage was not counterfeit. According to Thucydides, the capture of Spartan prisoners on Sphacteria was the most surprising event of the entire Peloponnesian War, especially to Athenians (4.40). Second, one can imagine a Spartan reply to this picture. As Brasidas urges the Spartan allies in the fifth book of Thucydides (5.9), ‘Understand that in order to fight well a soldier needs desire, shame (honour), and obedience to his commanders.’ To Spartan commanders, the Spartans and their allies have nothing to be ashamed of in adhering to their ‘socially compulsory’ courage, especially since shame-driven discipline seems to work so well as a motivational force. Most importantly, as we shall see, the Athenians themselves integrated the fear of shame, as well as fear of the law, into their own attempts at the social production of courage. The ideological contrast breaks down almost as soon as it is built up. Athenian democrats agreed that shame and fear of the law were appropriate ways to understand the social production of courage. Over time, they integrated these paradigms into their own democratic ideology.

Alongside his historically conditioned emphasis on Athenian rationality, Pericles also mobilized attitudes of shame centered on living up to the ideals of one’s ancestors. In the Funeral Oration, Athenian citizens came to understand shame when they heard of the exploits of the fallen soldiers, who had exemplified their ancestors’ ideals in battle.⁵⁰ As Pericles puts it, the fallen soldiers ‘fled a shameful reputation, but firmly

⁴⁷ ἐλεύθεροι γὰρ εἶντες οὐ πάντα ἐλεύθεροί εἰσι· ἔπεστι γάρ σφι δεσπότης νόμος, τὸν ὑποδουλοῦνται πολλῶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ σοὶ σέ. ποιέουσι γὰρ τὰ ἂν ἐκεῖνος ἀνάγῃ· ἀνάγει δὲ τὰυτὸ αἰεὶ, οὐκ ἔων φεύγειν οὐδὲν πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων ἐκ μάχης, ἀλλὰ μένοντας ἐν τῇ τάξει ἐπικρατεῖν ἢ ἀπόλλυσθαι. The translation is from S. Forsdyke, ‘Athenian democratic ideology and Herodotus’ Histories’, *AJP* 122 (2001), 329–58, at 347–8.

⁴⁸ See Forsdyke (n. 47), 348; similarly, E. Millender, ‘Herodotus and Spartan despotism’, in A. Powell and S. Hodkinson (edd.), *Sparta: Beyond the Mirage* (London, 2003), 29–31; Millender (n. 9), 39–47.

⁴⁹ Millender (n. 48), 30; cf. Millender (n. 9).

⁵⁰ S. Monoson has offered a searching account of Pericles’ emphasis on the *paideia* offered to

awaited their task though it meant risking their lives' (2.42.4).⁵¹ Moreover, fifth-century Athens had its own 'topography of courage', in which the city's public monuments encouraged citizens to recall famous figures from the past as role models by whose standards their present behaviour would be judged. Citizens were expected, as much as possible, to live up to the ideals they embodied. Examples of this are the statues of the tyrant-slayers, Harmodius and Aristogeiton, which stood in the agora, and the herm monuments commemorating the Athenians' victory over the Persians at Eion on the Strymon in 475 B.C.⁵² The Herm statues forced viewers to meet their gaze and therefore to be judged by their example. The tyrannicides are larger-than-life statues meant to be inspirational for Athenians as they aspired to practise and defend freedom—something that they were constantly urged to do throughout the classical democracy, even in the absence of apparent threats to the democratic way of life (cf. Dem. 20.160–2). They exemplified, in the Athenian popular consciousness, the courageous assertion of freedom both within the city and outside its borders. As references in both comedy and oratory show, they represented an ideal of masculine courage that each individual citizen was expected, in the eyes of the community, to live up to (Ar. *Vesp.* 1224–7, *Lys.* 631–35; Aesch. 1.140; Lyc. 1.50–1; Dem. 20.69–70; Hyp. 6.39–40).⁵³

Instead of viewing shame in a derogatory way, therefore, democratic Athenians could argue that shame was the proper way to understand the legitimately pre-rational, character-based training given by Athenian culture to its prospective citizen-soldiers. A properly developed sense of shame encouraged these Athenians to live up to appropriate ideals and to emulate well-chosen role models. Feeling this sort of appropriate shame does not conflict with a rational understanding of the agent's good. Rather, it helps educate the non-rational parts of the soul (so to speak), through images and models, to live up to the standards that we rationally perceive to be in our enlightened self-interest.⁵⁴ We can rationally choose who our models are to be, based on our understanding of what courage demands in our lives as a whole, but, once that choice is made, further work on the individual's character must be done: that is the work of modelling. It drives people to emulate and imitate models that are seen to be appropriate. As Plato saw in *Republic* Books 2–3, this kind of imitative behaviour targeting worthy role models is a fitting and necessary part of the training of individuals' non-rational character, especially when they are young. In the area of shame, then, the fifth-century Athenian emphasis is on role models of courage who provide a standard which Athenian citizens must live up to, on pain of censure and disgrace.

living citizens by soldiers who have sacrificed their lives for the sake of the city: see 'Citizen as *erastēs*: erotic imagery and the idea of reciprocity in the Periclean Funeral Oration', *Political Theory* 22.2 (1994), 253–76, at 268.

⁵¹ τὸ μὲν αἰσχρὸν τοῦ λόγου ἔφυγον, τὸ δ' ἔργον τῷ σώματι ὑπέμειναν. As Rusten (n. 15), 162 points out, Pericles encourages his audience to 'develop the same resolution as the dead (διάνοιαν 43.1 and τῆς γνώμης 43.3 refer to the attitude described in 42.4)'.
⁵² On the tyrannicide statues and their role in the classical Athenian 'imaginary', see M. Taylor, *The Tyrant-Slayers: The Heroic Image in Fifth-Century B.C. Art and Politics* (Salem, 1991); on the paradigmatic role of the herm monuments, see R. Osborne, 'The erection and mutilation of the Hermai', *PCPS* 211, n.s. 31 (1985), 47–73.

⁵³ For additional references, see Taylor (n. 52), 104.
⁵⁴ On the subject of role models, Hobbs (n. 28), 59–68, makes an excellent contribution both in general and in elucidating the distinctively Platonic configuration of character and intellect in the production of courage.

Still, it is worth noticing that shame either includes an element of fear by definition or is itself an object of fear. As the Athenian Stranger says in the Platonic *Laws* (646e–647a), there are two kinds of fear—first, expectation of evil in the future. ‘And,’ he says, ‘we often fear for our reputation, when we imagine we are going to get a bad name for doing or saying something disgraceful. This is the fear which we, and I fancy everyone else, call “shame”.’⁵⁵ Thus, even in Pericles’ ‘enlightened’ vision of the city, with its emphasis on rational choice and emulation of the fallen soldiers, the idealized Athenians are driven at least in part by fear, to the extent that Pericles employs shame as a rhetorical tool inspiring the Athenians to live up to the standards of their ancestors.⁵⁶

Beyond these considerations, gossip and other mechanisms of social control—what David Cohen has called the ‘politics of reputation’—were extremely effective coercive forces in domains such as honour and shame.⁵⁷ Thus, complementing Pericles’ vision of the city is a network of informal conversations that exerted pressure on individuals to conform to social norms. Finally, there were laws against cowardice in the fifth century, which overlap awkwardly with Pericles’ rationally inspired courage.⁵⁸ In Aristophanes’ *Acharnians*, for example, Lamachus predicts that Dicaeopolis is likely to be indicted for cowardice (δελλία) because of his private peace (1128–9).⁵⁹ Pericles’ emphasis on rational courage should not blind us to the other forces at play in the social production of courage in fifth-century Athens.

⁵⁵ Trans. Saunders (n. 28). It is possible of course to make a distinction between ‘shame’ considered as the experience of disgrace and humiliation—noting that at the time when a person experiences the disgrace, he presumably is not fearing it any longer, though he may fear its continuation—and ‘shame’ considered as Plato does in this quotation, namely as the sensibility that makes us fear a loss of reputation. Nothing in this paper hangs on the distinction, so I will be using the term loosely to cover both cases.

⁵⁶ Moreover, at Thuc. 2.37.3, Pericles emphasizes that the Athenians’ liberal attitudes do not compromise their obedience to the law—an obedience that is enforced through fear (δέος). In ‘The debate over civic education in classical Athens’, in Y. L. Too (ed.), *Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity* (Leiden, 2001), 175–207, at 199, Josiah Ober argues persuasively that Pericles ‘appropriates what democracy’s critics might claim as specifically Spartan virtues, notably the central Spartan value of obedience to the law’. To this might be added the psychological basis of that obedience in fear.

⁵⁷ D. Cohen, *Law, Sexuality, and Society: The Enforcement of Morals in Classical Athens* (Cambridge, 1992), 97; V. J. Hunter, *Policing Athens: Social Control in the Attic Lawsuits, 420–320 B.C.* (Princeton, 1994), 96–119, emphasizing that gossip upholds the norms of citizenship especially in a community in which shame is particularly powerful as a tool of social control.

⁵⁸ It may be that the relationship between Pericles’ ideal vision and the coercive laws is similar to that between the persuasive ‘preambles’ and the codified laws in Plato’s *Laws*: namely, that the former, in each case, encourages citizens to become their most cultivated and virtuous selves, for authentic and self-originating reasons, while the latter provides a ‘safety net’ that compels citizens to adhere to a minimally tolerable standard of behaviour.

⁵⁹ The first formal citation of a law on cowardice comes in Andocides’ speech *On the Mysteries*, which was delivered in 399 B.C. In the midst of discussing disenfranchisement, Andocides says, ‘All who deserted on the field of battle, who were found guilty of evasion of military service, of cowardice, or of withholding a ship from action, all who threw away their shields . . . were deprived of their citizen rights, while retaining possession of their property’ (1.74). The translation is lightly adapted from K. Maidment, *Minor Attic Orators* 1 (Cambridge, MA, 1982). The loss of citizen rights was a severe penalty to Athenians. This was not simply a law that lay flat ‘on the books’. An anti-democratic pamphlet, probably written in the 420s B.C., by the so-called ‘Old Oligarch’, refers in passing to the Athenian citizenry sitting in court to hear cases of cowardice during the Peloponnesian War (3.5). For other references, see Lys. 14.7; Aesch. 3.175; Dem. 15.32 with D.M. McDowell, *The Law in Classical Athens* (Ithaca, NY, 1978), 159–61.

V. TRANSFORMATIONS IN SHAME AND COURAGE: ATHENS IN THE FOURTH CENTURY

In the fourth century, the Athenian arguments linking courage and democracy emphasized fear and shame more than one finds in the fifth century: Athenians developed specifically democratic arguments for the superiority of democratic courage based on shame and fear of the law. In 338 B.C., in his own funeral speech after the Athenian defeat at Chaeronea, Demosthenes interpreted the courage of his fallen fellow-citizens as a product of their status as citizens of a democracy (25). As he argues:

It is not possible to keep frank speech (*παρρησίαν*), which depends upon the truth, from making the truth clear. It is impossible for those who do something shameful to win over everyone, with the result that a single citizen's truthful reproach is painful; for even those who would not themselves denigrate others are happy when they hear someone else utter a reproach. Fearing these things, all these men, naturally enough in view of the shame resulting from future reproaches, stoutly withstood the danger confronting them from our enemies and chose a noble death over a shameful life. (26)⁶⁰

Here the fifth-century sense of shame created by the Athenians' heroic ancestors, such as the tyrannicides, is replaced by the critical and judgemental vision of one's fellow citizens. The similarity to the shame-driven courage attributed to Sparta in the fifth century is readily apparent, except that here Athens's shame is supposed to be unique because it is derived from specifically democratic free speech. In the world of Athenian ideology, this makes Athenian democrats more courageous than their current rivals, the Macedonians, or citizens of any other non-democratic state.

Similarly, Athenians also viewed fear of the law as productive of courage. In one of his many verbal assaults on Demosthenes, Aeschines accused Demosthenes of cowardice, alleging that everyone in the audience could think of examples to prove it. That being so, he argues, he need only remind his fellow citizens of the laws:

The ancient lawgiver Solon considered it necessary to punish all alike the citizen who avoids service, the one who deserts his rank, and the coward. You see, we allow indictments on the charge of cowardice. You might be amazed to learn that we hear indictments for natural faults; we do. For what reason? In order that each of us, fearing the punishments exacted by the laws more than the enemy, might prove to fight better on behalf of his fatherland. (3.175)

For precisely these reasons, in a speech against the Younger Alcibiades, Lysias praises the ordinary Athenian jurors, saying that by contrast with his opponent, 'You did not dare to leave the ranks or to choose what you yourself found most gratifying, but you feared the city's laws much more than the risk you ran against the enemy' (14.15). Thus those who believe that fear of the law was a distinctively Spartan variation in the Greek concept of freedom, and others who argue that allegations of Spartan fear of the law carried an undercurrent of criticism from the democratic perspective, all offer partial and incomplete accounts of democratic ideology.⁶¹

⁶⁰ καὶ τὴν παρρησίαν τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας ἡρτημένην οὐκ ἔστι τἀληθές δηλοῦν ἀποτρέψαι. οὐδὲ γὰρ πάντας ἐξαρέσασθαι τοῖς αἰσχρόν τι ποιήσασιν δυνατόν, ὥσθ' ὁ μόνος τἀληθές ὄνειδος λέγων λυπεῖ· καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὴδὲν ἂν εἰπόντες αὐτοὶ βλάσφημον, ἄλλου γε λέγοντος χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες. ἃ φοβούμενοι πάντες εἰκότως τῇ τῶν μετὰ ταῦτ' ὀνειδῶν αἰσχύνῃ τὸν τ' ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων κίνδυνον προσιόντ' εὐρώστως ὑπέμειναν, καὶ θάνατον καλὸν εἶλοντο μᾶλλον ἢ βίον αἰσχρόν. The translation is adapted from that of the de Witts (n. 28).

⁶¹ For the former view, see K. A. Raaflaub, *Die Entdeckung der Freiheit* (Munich, 1985); for the latter, see the articles of Millender (nn. 9, 48), Forsdyke (n. 47).

In the context of the Peloponnesian War, Athenian discussions of courage emphasized rationality as a way of distinguishing Athenians from the self-evidently courageous Spartans. At the same time, Athenian public speeches and monuments strongly suggest that shame was part of the Athenians' self-conscious reflection upon courage, even though this emphasis on shame made them similar to, rather than different from, the Spartans. The cultivation of a sense of shame took the particular form of encouraging individuals to live up to models of appropriately courageous behaviour—appropriate in that the courage of past heroes was directed toward maintaining Athenian freedom. In the fourth century, however, as Nick Fisher has shown, most Athenians were not nearly as antagonistic to Sparta in public forums.⁶² Athens and Sparta maintained reasonably peaceful political relations for much of the century, partly because of their shared hostility toward Thebes, which is illustrated by their alliance with each other against Thebes in 369. After the liberation of the Messenian Helots in 369 and the Battle of Mantinea in 362, however, Sparta became weaker than ever. The 'Spartan mirage' was now truly a mirage, and it was useful as such. The Spartans had won the Peloponnesian War, which meant that there was something to be said for their style of courage, but they had also become a military backwater by the mid to late fourth century, because of their notorious problems with manpower (*oliganthrôpia*).⁶³ Thus it was safer for Athenians to add to their rationalistic accounts of courage, understandings that deployed concepts and terminology that once had been attributed emphatically, and sometimes negatively, to the Spartans. In part the Athenians' emphasis on shame and fear of the law brought to light elements in their own thinking that had once been de-emphasized because of their hostility toward Sparta. But in the fourth century they emphasized fear: their arguments about shame were less concerned with providing models and more concerned with the punitive possibilities of failing to carry out one's legally imposed duties. Without abandoning its claim to practical rationality, the democracy also showed itself capable of absorbing an emphasis on fear and articulating it in a newly democratic idiom.

A final twist in this evolution came at the end of the fourth century, when Lycurgus established a rigorous system of formal military education for Athens's young men, the *ephebeia*, which was similar in some respects to the educational patterns of Sparta. Athens was expanding its cultural hold over courage by absorbing the Spartan model in ideology and in practice. Lycurgus' speech *Against Leocrates* illustrates the conclusion to which the classical Athenian paradigm was ultimately driven. The speech condemns Leocrates for leaving Athens after the Athenians' defeat at Chaeronea. He did so, Lycurgus alleges, in a cowardly fashion and in defiance of a democratic decree forbidding anyone to leave the city or remove his family for the sake of safety. The speech is a kind of anti-funeral oration: it darkly depicts the breakdown of civic order and safety that results from the cowardice of traitors like Leocrates. It opens with a prayer to Athena, other gods, and the heroes whose statues are erected in the city and countryside—everyone is watching. For Lycurgus cowardice is such an elemental defect that it naturally implies that Leocrates has committed not only one crime, but all crimes: 'I believe, gentlemen, that all the greatest and most atrocious

⁶² Fisher, 'Sparta re(de)valued: some Athenian public attitudes to Sparta between Leuctra and the Lamian War', in A. Powell and S. Hodkinson (edd.), *The Shadow of Sparta* (London, 1994), 347–99.

⁶³ The most successful account of this problem can be found in P. Cartledge, *Agésilao and the Crisis of Sparta* (Baltimore, 1987), 37–43, 167–8, 411–12.

crimes are today included within the scope of your single verdict, for Leocrates can be shown to have committed them all—treason, overthrowing the democracy, impiety, injuring his ancestors, and desertion and refusal to serve in combat (147–8).⁶⁴

For us there are two major twists. First, Lycurgus holds up Sparta as a moral exemplar to Athenians: the Spartans have laws that condemn to death those who refuse to risk their lives for their country; survival after war is subject to scrutiny that might involve disgrace and death; in short, he says, ‘The fear of one’s own community is a strong thing and will compel men to face danger against an enemy; no one will forsake his country in times of peril when he sees that a traitor is punished with death’ (129–30).⁶⁵ He recommends that it would be expedient for the Athenians to abide by these laws as well. With Sparta out of the way militarily, it was a straightforward matter to call upon the Spartan ideal in order to produce courage—even at Athens. But the second twist is even more striking. However educational the Spartan model may be for contemporary Athenians, the Spartans got their blueprint of courage, in the deep past, from Athens itself. When the Spartans were at war with the Messenians way back in the seventh century, Lycurgus informs us, the god advised them to take a leader from Athens. The leader was no ordinary general but rather the militaristic poet Tyrtaeus who helped make the Spartans courageous. In Lycurgus’ words, ‘Tyrtaeus left them elegiac poems by his own hand, and through listening to these the Spartans are trained to be brave’ (106).

The circle is now complete. The Athenian democracy has shown itself to be a uniquely absorbent political system, in that it has integrated Spartan models for the production of courage into its own organization, despite Pericles’ attempt to distance Athenians from Spartans in the area of courage. Throughout the classical period, this analysis shows, Athenians developed their self-image with Sparta in mind—perhaps the greatest tribute to Spartan courage of which they were capable. But the democracy insisted that when there was thinking to be done about the future, whether it might be in the Assembly, or in the militaristic poems of Tyrtaeus, the Athenians were the leaders. Their contextually driven exploitation of the cultural resources and lines of argument related to courage illustrates that, with regard to ingenuity at least, they were right.

None the less, they left many contradictions unexplored, primary among which is their emphasis on hoplite battle, as opposed to naval warfare, as the paradigmatic instance of courage. This surely had ideological significance both within Athens, in relations between hoplites and *thetes*, and outside Athens, in relations between Athens and its military adversaries. The surprising fact is that the potential for conflict between hoplites and *thetes* was defused to the extent it was. Hoplites always sided with the *demos* against aristocrats in revolutionary situations, such as those at the end of the fifth century.⁶⁶ Athens was versatile enough to honour its hoplites in public forums and to allow political power to reside in the hands of the *demos* as a whole, *thetes* included.⁶⁷ This may have been made possible in part by the interest these groups

⁶⁴ This and the following translations of Lycurgus are taken from Burtt (n. 34).

⁶⁵ ὁ γὰρ παρὰ τῶν πολιτῶν φόβος ἰσχυρὸς ὧν ἀναγκάσει τοὺς πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους κινδύνους ὑπομένειν· τίς γὰρ ὁρῶν θανάτῳ ζημιούμενον τὸν προδότην ἐν τοῖς κινδύνους ἐκλείψει τὴν πατρίδα;

⁶⁶ See Hanson (n. 20), 380–8.

⁶⁷ For further exploration of this apparent contradiction, see Hanson (n. 20), 380–8. D. M. Pritchard, ‘“The fractured imaginary”: popular thinking on military matters in fifth century Athens’, *Ancient History* 28.1 (1998), 38–61 offers a probing account of the hoplites’ ideological centrality, while also showing that *thetes* naval competence was highly valued and publicly

shared in defining Athenian citizens of whatever class as courageous in contrast to the Spartans.⁶⁸

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acknowledged in fifth-century Athens; see also Pritchard, 'Thetes, hoplites, and the Athenian imaginary', in T. W. Hillard, R. A. Kearsley, C. E. V. Nixon, and A. M. Nobbs (edd.), *Ancient History in a Modern University* (Grand Rapids, 1998), 121–7. For interesting arguments on thetes, democratic ideology, and public recognition, see Barry S. Strauss, 'The Athenian trireme, school of democracy', in Ober and Hedrick (n. 20), 313–26; Strauss, 'Perspectives on the death of fifth-century Athenian seamen', in van Wees (n. 21), 261–84.

⁶⁸ This idea complements, rather than conflicts with, the view of Hunt (n. 9), who argues convincingly that rich and poor citizens defined themselves ideologically in opposition to slaves—even though both Athens and Sparta made extensive military use of slaves and other 'unfree' persons throughout the classical period. The Athenian ideology of courage helped to create a unified belief-system and self-image for all Athenian citizens. Versions of this paper were delivered in Berkeley and Minneapolis; I thank the audiences in each place for helpful questions and comments. I would also like to thank Robin Osborne, Mark Toher, Katharina Volk, Hillel Kieval, Miriam Griffin, David Pritchard, and the anonymous referee for help in preparing this piece.